Motions to Make Specific and to Resolve Conclusions by Arnold, Walter R.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 1
11-1931
Motions to Make Specific and to Resolve
Conclusions
Walter R. Arnold
Member, South Bend Bar
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Courts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arnold, Walter R. (1931) "Motions to Make Specific and to Resolve Conclusions," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 7: Iss. 2, Article 1.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol7/iss2/1
INDIANA
LAW JOURNAL
Vol. VII. NOVEMBER, 1931 No. 2
MOTIONS TO MAKE SPECIFIC AND TO RESOLVE
CONCLUSIONS
WALTER R. ARNOLD*
I
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE ARTICLE
The cardinal aim of this article is to provide, by formulary
rules, based on the history of pleading and precepts of logic
underlying the art, as precise and scientific a means as possible
of determining when a motion to make more specific is, and when
it is not sustainable. In the accomplishment of this objective,
resort is not had to any arbitrary fiat. The intention is to dem-
onstrate that, with a few singular exceptions to be noted, the Su-
preme and Appellate Courts of Indiana have quite consistently
decided in accord with the answer which the formula would
provide in its application to each case; but that, while such result
coincided with method, the reasons postulated for the result have
been, generally speaking, vague, obscure, and haphazard and of
small value as precedent guides to the bench and profession. The
conclusions in the decisions were generally sounder than the rea-
soning by which they were reached. In short, it is sought here
to show that the barque of decision has almost always attained
its destination without chart or compass-steering laboriously
and hesitantly by instinct or intuition-whereas there lay close
to the hands of the navigators all needful materials to construct
the instrumentalities of accurate reckoning.
II
HISTORY
Frequently it is necessary to ponder the raison d'etre for a
rule of law, so that the application of the rule may be rendered
effective. Hence it is deemed wise, at the outset, to attend some-
* Of the South Bend bar.
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what on the historicity of the rules of common-law pleading as
useful in throwing some light on the present status, purpose, and
utility of the statutory motion to make more specific and to state
facts to support conclusions of fact.
It is here purposed to develop the theory that ancient forms
of pleading have a controlling bearing upon the proper applica-
tion in practice, of the statutes1 because
"the common law of England, and statutes of the British Parlia-
ment made in aid thereof prior to the fourth year of the reign
of James the First (1607) * * * which are of a general
nature, not local to that Kingdom, and not inconsistent with the"
Constitution of the United States and of the State of Indiana, and
statutes made pursuant thereto, continue as effective law of In-
diana.2 That the statutes and usages at common law, pertain-
ing to pleadings, were drawn into the corpus juris of our own
state, except as inconsistent with legislation, is established by
precedent.3 For it is said:
"The general principles and remedies of the English Com-
mon law and British Parliament made in aid thereof prior to the
year 1607, prevail in Indiana insofar as they are not inconsistent
with the Constitution of the United States or of this State"
and this is especially so with relation to rules of pleadings and
procedure. 4 It cannot, therefore, be inappropriate to take note
of those rules of common law pleading as we find them at the
time of the adoption of our code in 1852.
A good pleading was required to state nothing except facts
and permissible derivative factual conclusions, viz., naught but
facts as they really existed, or were, by legal fiction or presump-
tion, deemed to exist.5
All the material facts on either side, were required to be
pleaded in positive and direct terms, and not argumentatively-
that is, in a manner which kept them open to be selected by infer-
ence-nor by way of recital, as under a "whereas."6
1 Secs. 359, 360 and 403 Burns R. S. Indiana, 1926.
2 Sec. 244, Burns R. S. 1926.
3 Wabash R. Co. v. McCormick, 23 Ind. 258 (260) ; State, ex rel. v. Home
Brewing Co., 182 Ind. 75 (80 and 81); Union Trust Co. v. Curtis, 182 Ind.
61 (68); Curless v. Watson, 180 Ind. 86 (104).
4 Atkinson v. Disher, 177 Ind. 665 (673); Yawger v. Joseph, 184 Ind.
228; Wiles v. Lambert, 66 Ind. 494.
5 Lawes Pleadings, 45 Lawes 8 Co. 155; Doug. Pleadings, 159.
6 Co. Litt. 303a; Bac. Abbr. Pleas, etc., B5 (4) I. 5; Yelv. 223; Com. Dig.
Pleader, E. 3.
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Certainty in pleadings, according to My Lord Coke, as ex-
pounded at the common law, were met with in three sorts or de-
grees: (1) certainty to a common intent; (2) certainty to a
certain intent in general; and, (3) certainty to a certain intent
in every particular. 7
Certainty to a common intent, the lowest degree permissi-
ble under the rules, was sufficient only in pleas in bar, rejoinders,
and such other pleadings on the part of the defendant as went to
the action, e. g., the general issue; payment; failure of considera-
tion, etc., etc.8
Certainty to a certain intent in general, was required in
counts, replications, and other pleadings on the part of the
plaintiff.9
Mr. Justice Buller, in essaying a distinction between the first
two forms of certainty, observed:
"By a common intent I understand, that when words are used
that will bear a natural sense and also an artificial, one or one
to be made out by argument and inference, the natural sense shall
prevail. It is simply a rule of construction, and not of addition.
Common intent cannot add to a sentence words which are
omitted; but where certainty to a certain intent in general is re-
quired, if words are used which will bear these two senses, they
may be taken, it seems, either way against the party pleading;
though as against the adverse party they can be understood only
in their natural sense: so that if either sense will operate against
the pleading, his pleading is defective. By 'certainty to a certain
intent in general' is meant what, upon a fair and reasonable con-
struction may be called certain, without recurring to possible
facts which do not appear."'1
When the pleading was required to be "certain to a certain
intent in every particular," the utmost fullness in particularity
of statement as well as the highest attainable accuracy was requi-
site. On the one hand, nothing was to be supplied by intendment
or construction, and on the other, no supposable special answer
unobviated."l The latter was required in special diliatory pleas,
such as pleas in abatement, and the rule survives to the present
day.12
7 Co. Litt. 303a; Com. Dig. Pleader, C. 17.
8 Cowp. 682; Doug. 159; 2 H. Black 350.
9 Co. Litt. 303a; Com. Dig. Pleader, C. 24; 2 Lill. Ab., 377.
10 2 H. Black. 530; Doug. 159.
11 Co. Litt. 352b.
12 Meedham v. Wright, 140 Ind. 180; State v. Comer, 157 Ind. 611;
Knotts v. Clark Construction Co, 191 Ind. 354.
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However, the requisites of certainty respected only the man-
ner in which particulars were stated, and these were required
in general to be stated distinctly and explicitly so as to exclude
ambiguity and make the meaning of the averment clear and in-
telligible.
The only remedy open to the defendant (or to the plaintiff, in
the case of a special answer) for failing to observe these com-
mon-law rules, was the general demurrer until 27 Elizabeth. 13
Prior to the act of Elizabeth, supra, a general demurrer reached
a defect in substance, as well as one in form, and the act was
drawn to require the demurrer to bring out and emphasize such
defects more clearly, so as to avoid surprise to the opposite side.
The statute, in substance, provided that in all demurrers to the
pleadings on either side, all defects and imperfections merely
formal, except such as are expressly and specially set down and
assigned for cause of demurrer, are aided and may, by the court,
be amended. A long train of decisions followed bearing on the
proper construction of the statute, with particular respect as to
what were "formal," and what "substantive" defects. To render
the statute more certain, anotherl3a was enacted, partly in ex-
planation and partly in extension of that of Elizabeth, and also
expressly specifying a variety of particular defects which,
though before deemed substantial, were by the latter acts vir-
tually converted into matters of form that were inexigible on
general demurrer. 13b
Lord Hobart, in passing upon the statute of Elizabeth for the
purpose of differentiating between what was "substance" and
what "form," couched the distinction in this quaint language:
"That without which the right doth sufficiently appear to the
court, is form; but that by reason whereof the right appears not,
is substance."'1
It is frequently assumed that under the system of common
law pleading in vogue prior to the adoption of the code, the
shrewd pleader could manage to render his pleading impregna-
ble, against a demurrer, general or special, and yet effectively
conceal from his adversary the essential facts upon which he
based his action or defense. That this is not true, is amply
13 27 Elizabeth, Chap. 5, Sec. 1.
13a 4 and 5 Anne, Chap. 16.
13b 1 Chitt. Pl. 641-3.
14 Hob. 233.
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demonstrated. Where properly exigible (in practically the same
circumstances as motions to make more specific and certain)
common-law courts, on special demurrer, as to matters of fact
or where the form was imperfect-a lack in definiteness, cer-
tainty, or precision-ruled a pleader as quickly to amend as our
courts do under the code on prayers in motions to make more
definite and specific. 15
As a matter, therefore, of comparative law, it may be asserted
with some show of confidence, that the remedy by motion to make
more definite, certain and specific, and to state facts to support
conclusions of fact, created and administered under the code, is
not substantially different than, nor does it add any remedies or
preclude any rights that were not in existence or were not pre-
cluded by, the special demurrer; and the analogy of the practice
may, we believe, be taken as recognized that the motion, in its
various stages, performs the same functions that the special de-
murrer did at common law. 16 Although it is stated that it has a
broader application. 17
III
THE INDIANA CODE PROVISIONS
In actual practice motions to make more definite, certain, and
specific, and to state facts to support conclusions of fact, have
been applied infinitely more frequently than the special demurrer
was at common law; much of this has undoubtedly been on ac-
count of a co-ordinate section of the code, 17a which has been con-
strued in many instances, especially by the bar, as inviting laxity
and artlessness in pleading. The enactment which first gave life
to motions to make more specific, was section 90 of the code, of
1852, which provided:
"In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of deter-
mining its effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed with
a view to substantial justice between the parties; but when the
allegations of a pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that the
1 Christmas v. Russel, 5 Wall. 290 (307), 72 L. Ed. 475 (479); Snyder
v. Croy, 2 Johns. 428, 5 Black. 556; Stesse v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 156 Mass.
262; Addison v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co., 48 Mich. 155.
16 Yaw ger v. Joseph, 184 Ind. 228; Wiles v. Lambert, 66 Ind. 494.
17 Wiles v. Lambert, supra.
17a Sec. 359, Subdiv. 2, Burns R. S. 1926.
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precise nature of the charge or defense is not apparent, the court
may require the pleading to be made definite and certain by
amendment."' 8
The early motions to make more specific and to state facts
to support conclusions, were predicated entirely upon that sec-
tion of the statute, re-enacted in 1881 as part of the code; but in
191319 the legislature enlarged the scope of the motion, and
reciprocally liberalized the pleadings to which it was to be ad-
dressed, by providing that:
"All recitals in and all statements contained in any participial
expression, or following the words 'having' or 'being', shall be
considered and held to be allegations of fact whenever necessary
to the sufficiency thereof; and all conclusions stated therein shall
be considered and held to be the allegations of all the facts re-
quired to sustain said conclusion, when the same is necessary to
the sufficiency of such pleading, paper, or writing; provided, that
as against such conclusions, only the following remedy is given,
that a motion may be made to require the party filing such plead-
ing, paper, or writing to state the facts necessary to sustain the
conclusion alleged, said motion setting out wherein such plead-
ing, paper, or writing is insufficient. If no such motion is made
and ruled upon, all objections on account thereof are waived. '20
IV.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOTIONS
In practice, prayers addressed to courts nisi for details or,
facts in addition or extension to those set forth in the pleading,
have taken the form (in nomenclature) of at least four varieties:
"motion to take more specific," "motion to make more definite
and certain," "motion to require facts to support conclusions,"
and "motion for a bill of particulars."
We regard the motion for a bill of particulars entirely apart
from the motions under discussion here. The motion for a bill
of particulars is not a creature of the code, although it is men-
tioned in the code.2' The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has de-
clined to "draw any distinction between the functions of an order
for a bill of particulars and an order requiring a pleading to be
18 Sec. 403, Burns R. S. 1926.
19 Acts 1913, p. 50, as amended Acts 1915, p. 124, Sec. 360, Burns R. S.
1926.
20 Sec. 360, Burns R. S. 1926.
21 Burns R. S. 1926, Sec. 114.
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made more definite and certiin," believing the distinction has no
tangible existence in reason or law. 22 It is quite apparent that
the framers of the code recognized the distinction, and meant the
"bill of particulars" to continue in Indiana practice as the bill
of particulars exigible at common law, for it has been held that
where a bill of particulars is demandable, but the movant files a
motion to make more definite and specific, the latter is properly
overruled ;23 and that the particulars, when furnished, do not
control the averments of the complaint as would the particular
facts as set forth in the complaint pursuant to a motion to make
more specific, is also held.24 While the line of demarcation be-
tween what facts may be elicited by a motion for a bill of par-
ticulars, which is not ordinarily demandable in an action sound-
ing in tort,24a and facts exigible by motion to make more specific,
may on occasion be tenuous, a fairly accurate statement or dif-
erentiation is that in the former instance details of analysis are
demandable that the moving party is not required, as matter of
either substance or form, to allege in the body of his pleading
where it suffices to allege the bald aggregate or sum total, where-
as in the case of a motion for facts, the aggregate itself is imper-
fectly defined or identified. For example: When in an action
on account the plaintiff alleges that defendant is indebted to
plaintiff for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered by
plaintiff to defendant in the sum of Fifty Dollars, the body of the
pleading is sufficient in substance and fornm, but defendant is
entitled to have the aggregate "goods, wares and merchandise of
the value of fifty dollars," broken up into its constituent parts
by a bill of particulars, showing when and what merchandise
was sold and the value of each particular item. However, if the
allegation is that "defendant is indebted to plaintiff in the sum of
fifty dollars," there is something in form lacking-the aggregate
is not defined or identified-the transaction which gave rise to
the debt is not stated and the body may be required to be made
specific, definite and certain.
It is a more difficult, sometimes an impossible task, to under-
take the differentiation between "motions to make more specific,"
22 Conover v. Knight, 84 Wise. 639 (642), 54 N. W. 1002.
23 Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Ry. Co. v. Henley et al., 88 Ind.
535 (537).
24 Chapman v. The Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 11 Ind. App. 632
(635).
24a City of Plymouth v. Field, 125 Ind. 323 (324).
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"motions to state facts to support conclusions," and "motions to
make definite and certain." As between the first and last of
these three, an effort to differentiate would more properly belong
to the realm of metaphysics than to the field of pleading. The
distinction merely exists in the caption or denomination; the body
certainly calls for the same relief, and they are hereinafter dealt
with as identical under the appelation of "motions to make more
specific."
There is, however, merit to the contention that a formal and
perhaps substantial distinction exists between the "motion to
make more specific" and the "motion to state facts to support
conclusions." The distinction is based upon the fact that each
has a different parentage. Motions to make more specific, as
heretofore stated, derive from Section 90 of the code of 1852,25
whereas motions to state facts to support conclusions derive from
the act of 1913.26 True, prior to 1913, Section 90 of the code was
construed to provide a remedy against factual conclusions. Prior
to the adoption of the act of 1913, it was held that the remedy to
require a resolution of a conclusion into its component facts was
properly attainable by motion to make more certain and definite,
rather than by a special demurrer.2 Our courts had already gen-
erally assimilated, as a matter of practice, what was subsequently
enacted. With the advent of the automobile and other means of
rapid transportation, the general increase in tempo of living in
the 20th century and the resulting tragedies attending the indus-
trial revolution, and the enactment of much legislative regula-
tion to ,avert disastrous consequences, the motion to resolve con-
clusions into facts, became of increasingly greater importance in
pleading, especially with reference to the application of statutory
provisions to acts and omissions alleged in negligence cases. But
that the act of 1913 did work a distinction between the two mo-
tions under consideration, is apparent from the fact that for
mere indefiniteness, as against factual conclusions, stated in the
pleading, under section 90 of the code no duty is laid on the
movant to bring into play the power of the court to "require the
pleading to be made definite and certain by amendment." And
it would appear that a simple motion, without specifically calling
attention to the ambiguities, imperfections, uncertainties, du-
25 Sec. 403 Burns R. S. 1926.
26 Sec. 360, Burns R. S. 1926.
27 Myers v. Jackson et al., 135 Ind. 136 (137); Doman et al v. Bedunnah,
57 Ind. 219 (220); Ohio, etc., R. W. Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471 (479).
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plicities, or argumentation, sufficed. Under the act of 1915, it is
required that "said motion shall set out wherein such pleading,
paper or writing is insufficient" 28 and it is held that under the
Act of 1915, where conclusions are sought to be resolved by the
motion, the motion itself must be specific and conform to the
statute, or its overruling will not constitute error.29 So it is
concluded that, notwithstanding courts nisi and of review have
not drawn any apparent distinction between the two motions,
there is in law and in practice a difference-each is generated
by a separate statute and serves a special purpose. If this dis-
tinction were borne in mind and drawn into the decisions predi-
cated on the two sections, respectively, it is not untoward to sug-
gest less confusion would result in ruling on technicalities of
procedure adopted for the purpose of invoking the remedy pre-
scribed.
V
REMEDY NOT AVAILABLE TO REACH CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
It is, of course, elementary that conclusions or statements of
law (except a foreign law, special regulation, or a municipal or-
dinance) have no proper place in a complaint, answer, or reply;
and a conclusion of law there interpolated is to be wholly disre-
garded in the pleading; hence a motion to make the pleading
more definite and specific as to such a conclusion, will not lie,
except the law pleaded or the conclusion averred be of that char-
acter necessarily pleaded, i. e., foreign statutes or municipal ordi-
nances, etc. Thus, to charge that a corporation had no power to
assign a promissory note, is a conclusion of law, for the powers
of a corporation are determined by the law. 30 Singularly enough,
after so deciding, the same justice in the same year held that a
motion was properly overruled which sought to require the court
to compel plaintiff to make more specific the following material
allegations in the complaint. "That the defendant took over all
the assets and assumed all the liabilities of Brown & Scott," hold-
ing that the allegation was an ultimate statement of fact, though
it might be called a conclusion of fact, and that what was sought
by the motion, in effect, was evidence.3 1 It is a trite observation
28 The act of 1913 required the motion to set "out therein the facts
claimed to be necessary thereto."
29 Avery Co. v. Harriot-Carithers Co., 81 Ind. App. 348.
30 Central Bank, etc., v. Martin, 70 Ind. App. 387 (394).
31 Outing Kumpfy-Kab Co. v. Ivey, 74 App. 286.
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that when making up issues, the court must look to the pleadings
for the facts, and to the books for the law. 32 While this tenet of
pleading is obvious, its application appears to be difficult-at;
least such a pessimistic note is justified when we review the deci-
sions which undertake an answer to the query: when is a con-
clusion one of fact, and when one of law? With the extremes,
we should have no difficulty, e. g., "Plaintiff says that defendant
was required by statute to dim his light at the time and place
aforesaid," is purely a conclusion of law and will go out on mo-
tion to strike; and that "defendant carelessly operated his said
automobile in said highway and against the plaintiff" is clearly
a conclusion of fact amenable to a motion to state facts to sup-
port the conclusion. However, Justice Ewbank, in 1921, in a
personal injury case under the Federal Employer's Liability Act,
held-and we think he fell into palpable error-the allegation in
the complaint that the injury "was caused solely by the negligent
acts and omissions of the defendant,"
"without alleging that the defendant did any negligent act, or
omitted to do anything, having a tendency to cause it, might
have to be disregarded as a mere statement of a conclusion of
law.",33
The case of Temple v. State3 4 is cited in support of such holding,
but on examination of the latter decision it appears that the alle-
gation in the complaint was to the effect that certain official pro-
ceedings in a school township were void because "the record was
not signed on the 24th day of March, 1914, as provided by law"
-clearly a conclusion of law. Another authority cited by Judge
Ewbank is Central Bank v. Martin,35 but there the allegation
was that a corporation doing business in Indiana had no legal
right to make a certain investment which is also, obviously, a
legal, and not a factual, proposition. We believe Judge Enloe, in
National Brew Co. v. Thrash,3 6 erroneously decided that the
allegation:
"these plaintiffs are the owners of a certain equity in the follow-
ixg described real estate"
32 Union Traction Co. v. Ross, 71 Ind. App. 473 (476).
33 Cincinnati R. Co. v. Little, Adm., 190 Ind. 662 (669).
34 185 Ind. 139 (146).
35 70 Ind. App. 387.
36 76 Ind. App. 381 (383).
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was a legal conclusion, also basing his decision on Central Bank,
etc., v. Martin, supra. And so it was wrongly held37 that the
averment that appellee "represented himself to be the owner of
the goods, whereas he was not such owner," was a mere conclu-
sion of law and not a conclusion of fact.
We are conscious of the appearance of presumptuousness that
must be inherent in the contradiction of such respectable author-
ity, nevertheless, equally respectable precedents of the Indiana
Supreme Court, coupled with fundamental rules of the logic of
pleading, support the assertion. An allegation that "defendant
negligently and carelessly injured and killed said George E.
Coombs" was held to be sufficient, as a conclusion of fact ;38 and
the Supreme Court correctly said:
"It has been uniformly held by this court that a failure to
state in detail the facts constituting negligence, does not render
the pleading insufficient, and that a general allegation of negli-
gence is sufficient to withstand a demurrer for want of facts, and
if a more specific statement of the acts of negligence is desired,
the remedy, if any, is a motion to make more specific and not a
demurrer for want of facts,"
(citing a number of cases).39 Going to more recent cases of our
Supreme Court,40 the charge that certain of appellee's fellow
workmen
"carelessly and negligently cut, unfastened and loosened the
wires holding the logs on the cars thereby causing the logs to
roll"
was held to be a conclusion of fact, and sufficient, in the absence
of a motion to make more specific ;.1 and it was held, that as
against a demurrer, it was sufficient to allege that defendant neg-
ligently did the act without stating particulars or circumstances.
On the question of ownership of property, witnesses may testify
who is or who is not the owner of property, real or personal ;42
whether a building was within the city limits. 43 What duties
the mining boss had to perform in looking after the rooms and
37 Abe et al. v. Summerville et al., 46 Ind. App. 348.
38 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Barnes, 164 Ind. 143 (151).
39 Nickey v. Stouder, 164 Ind. 189 (194).
40 Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville R. R. Co. ,. Meadlock, 187 Ind. 224.
41 Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Gillespie, 173 N. E. 708 (Ind.
App.).
42 22 C. J. 534.
43 Sheav. City of Muncie, 148 Ind. 14.
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entries, seeing that the walls were kept the proper thickness, was
not objectionable," and that the assignment of a contract for
the purchase of land was the consideration or the payment of
notes, was held not objectionable as calling for the conclusion
of a witness.45
The true criterion as to whether a statement in a pleading
is a conclusion of law or whether a conclusion of fact, would
appear to be, is it conceivable that the elements going into and
justifying or constituting the basis or foundation of the con-
clusion would be elicited on examination and given in evidence
before a jury? If the answer is in the negative, then it is a
conclusion of law; if in the affirmative, it would be a conclusion
of fact. Now it is quite obvious that in each of the cases cited
and herein criticized, the facts making up the conclusion would
have been properly admissible in evidence and apt material for
the consideration of the jury. The allegation "the record not
having been subscribed until the 25th of March, was not sub-
scribed in accordance with law" is a pure question of law, not
one of fact. The jury has nothing to do with the allegation. If
the subscription of the record took place on the 24th of March,
then it was for the court to say whether it was or was not in con-
formance to law. Negligence, however, is a question co-
mingled of law and fact, and, consequently, the facts entering
the conclusion are adducible before a jury for them to apply the
law as delivered by the court. Ownership of property is a ques-
tion of fact, the same as infancy, majority, sui juris, mental in-
competency. Of course, appropriate rules of law are applicable
to all such conditions, but the facts must first be ascertained
before the law can be applied. So long as facts are compre-
hended in the summational statement, which call for the applica-
tion of law, the conclusion is one of fact, and not of law.46
VI.
MOTION NOT ALLOWED TO ELICIT EVIDENTIARY MATTERS.
Another very difficult question presented to the courts both
nisi and on appeal, is the application of the rule that a motion to
make more specific, definite, and certain will not be sustained
where to do so would require the opposite party to plead evidence.
44Eureka Block Coal Co. v. Wells, 29 Ind. App. 1.
45 Baltes Land, Stone & Oil Co. v. Sutton, 32 Ind. App. 17.
46 49 C. J. 45.
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It is, of course, a well established general rule that a pleading
should allege only the ultimate facts to be established, and not
matters of evidence tending to establish them, and the absence
of an allegation of essential ultimate fact cannot be supplied
by allegations of matters of evidence which may afford the infer-
ence of such ultimate facts.4 7 As stated by the Supreme Court
of Alabama :48
"We take occasion here to suggest to pleaders that the rules
of the common law as to pleadings, which are only rules of logic,
have not been abolished by the Code. Pleadings should not state
the evidence, but the facts which are the conclusions from the
evidence, according to their legal effect, and complaints should
especially avoid wandering into matter which if traversed would
not lead to a decisive issue.4 9
The border line between appropriate ultimate facts to be
stated in a pleading, and a conclusion of fact, is sometimes ex-
tremely tenuous. Confronted on the one hand with the caveat
that evidence must not be pleaded, and on the other hand with
the knowledge that factual conclusions are amenable to a mo-
tion to make more specific, if they have a direct bearing or
formulate the gist of the action, it is sometimes a matter of deep
perplexity, both to counsel preparing a pleading and the court
passing upon a motion to make more specific, and motions to
strike, whether the finished product falls under the ban of one
or the enclave of the other. Numerous efforts have been made
by courts of last resort to posit a hard and fast rule and apposite
criteria. The attempts have been, in general, unsuccessful. What
strikes the writer as one of the most pertinent and sagacious
efforts, both in the substance of the rule and the illustration sub-
joined, is one excerpted from an Old English Report:
"Despite the use of the form" (answer of payment in action
of debt) "for upwards of a century, the plaintiff's counsel urge
that the plea is insufficient because a mere conclusion of the
pleader; that the pleader must set down the circumstances and
transactions which give rise to the defense, so that the allega-
tions of his plea may be put to the legal test. Arguing ab incon-
convenienti, the point is hypothetically made that were the de-
47 49 C. J. 40.
48 Great So. R. R. Co. v. Cardwell, 171 Ala. 274, 55 So. 185.
49 Alabama Great S. R. R. Co. v. Cardwell, 171 Ala. 274, 281, 55 So. 185;
Crump v. Mins, 64 N. C. 767, 771; Sec. 403 Burns' R. S. 1926; Kumpfy-Kab
Co. v. Ivey, 74 Ind. App. 286; 125 N. E. 234; Domestic Block Coal Co. v.
DeAr iey, 179 Ind. 592 (615).
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fendant to recite in his plea that on a Sabbath morning he met
the plaintiff's coachman and handed the latter five pounds ten
and six pence, and told the coachman to deliver the money to
plaintiff in discharge of the debt, and stopped there, no trial
would be necessary, because it would be the duty of the court
to hold the mode of payment bad; whereas, on the trial these
very facts would be shown-that the plaintiff never got the
money, and the coachman had no authority to receive any for the
account of plaintiff, and that the coachman absconded there-
with, and there would then be an adjudgment that the coachman
was defendant's, and not plaintiff's agent, and his making off
with the fund was defendant's loss, not plaintiffs. If the facts
were as plaintiff's counsel put them crguendo, and full disclosure
were made to that effect by defendant to his counsel, it would
ill become the latter under their vows to interpose the defense,
knowing the plea to be factitious; however, granted that such
were the case and despite the knowledge that the defense was
false, with the evidence pleaded instead of the ultimate fact of
payment, if the intent to make a fraudulent defense were de-
signed, is it not to be supposed that, by way of addenda, would
be appended the statement that the coachman did deliver the
money to plaintiff? Were the court to hold the argument good,
it must needs carry the demurrer back to plaintiff's own declara-
tion, where in it is alleged that the defendant, because of the
sale and delivery of divers articles of merchandise by plaintiff to
him, 'became and is indebted to plaintiff in the amount of five
pounds, ten shillings and six pence.' Cannot the defendant with
equal propriety argue that the declaration is bad because, for
aught therein appearing, plaintiff made delivery thereof to de-
fendant's servant who had no authority to receive the goods and
who absconded therewith?"
"'Tis not the ancientness of the form of the plea that alone
commends itself to the court. - There is the more profound and
stable reason that what is said therein is an ultimate fact, and
what is desired by plaintiff to see therein is evidence of the ulti-
mate fact pleaded. A rule for distinguishing between evidence
going to prove, or from which may be deduced the ultimate
fact, and the satement of the ultimate fact itself as apart from
a mere conclusion, is not easy of fabrication so 'twill fit all cases;
but the court believes that a generality might be found useful in
most instances. An ultimate fact in a plea is a compound of
subsidiary facts which are compressed into it, and which is
free from intermixture of the personal reflections, caprice, or
arbitrary judgment of the pleader or his client; a subsidiary
fact is a component part of the ultimate fact; a mere conclusion
-whether of law or of fact-is a compound 'of judgment, ca-
price, notion, personal reflection, or comparison with other sub-
sidary facts, and sometimes with the law or the opinion of the
pleader as to the law. For example, and applying the somewhat
superficial definition to the case at bar: Had the defendant by
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his plea averred what plaintiff contends he should have put
down, he would be pleading evidence; had he averred that he
had been discharged of the debt, it would have been a conclu-
sion of law; had he averred that he owed nothing to the plain-
tiff he would be remissive for alleging a conclusion of fact;
but by baldly averring payment, he charged an ultimate fact
in which was comprehended a carrying to and surrender unto
and a taking dominion of by the plaintiff of the full amount of
the debt-five pounds, ten shillings and six pence, coin of the
realm-whether through the agency of a servant, either for
plaintiff or defendant, or in propria manu." 0
VII
FORMULATION OF ANCIENT RULES TO APPLY TO MODERN
PRACTICE
The English judge who thus expressed himself was uttering
nothing antiquated then nor superannuated now, if there but be
kept in mind Mr. Justice Buller's distinctions between the dif-
ferent degree of certainty in pleading and appropriate appli-
cation be made of the various degrees to the different parts of
the plea. We here essay a solution of the problem by a tenta-
tive formula adapted, we believe, to all existing statutes and
rules of practice effective in Indiana, the object being to ascribe
to each of the degrees of certainty, supra, a particular area of
each plea upon which it operates; the means by which we en-
deavor to accomplish the desideratium is by breaking up the
pleading into its several formal elements. Our illustrations are
confined to formal analysis of complaints.
EXPRESS AVERMENTS
(Presentation of Facts)
I. Allegations Required to be Certain to a Common Intent
Status of Plaintiff
1. Capacity in which plaintiff sues and right to maintain
the action:
(a) Fiduciary, official, statutory or conventional,
Guardian of ward,
Trustee of trust,
Administrator of estate,
50 Archbl. Civ. P1. 634 et seq.
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Executor of will,
Clerk of court,
Resident of state, county, etc., etc., etc.
(b) Relative status of plaintiff:
Parent of child,
Husband of wife,
Stockholder of corporation,
Representative of numerous others similarly
situated, etc., etc.
2. Possession of right by plaintiff:
Ownership of property-real or personal.
Tenant of land,
Holder of license,
Bailor of bailment,
Passenger in automobile,
Paid guest at inn,
Servant of master,
Mechanic or artisan on building,
Insured under a policy,
Holder of note, etc., etc.
II. Allegations Required to be Certain to a Certain Intent in
General.
Inducement to Right of
Action Against Defendant
3. Relationship of plaintiff to res in action
Under contract of bailment,
Under lease,
Under mortgage,
Under contract of hire,
As taxpayer, etc., etc.
4. Relationship between plaintiff and defendant
Co-user of public highway,
Insured and insuror,
Possessor and trespasser,
Bailor and bailee,
Husband and adulterer, etc., etc.
III. Allegations Required to be Certain to a Certain Intent in
Every Particular
Gist of Right
of Action
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5. Conduct of defendant or privy constituting encroach-
ment of plaintiff's rights:
Breach of contract,
Breach of duty-private or official, express, im-
plied, statutory, etc.,
Breach of trust,
Trespass-to person or property-on case,
Slander of title,
Invasion of possession,
Unauthorized exercise of dominion, etc., etc.
6. Consequences of encroachment:
Collision and personal injury or property damages,
Deprivation of liberty,
Expenses in rectifying wrong,
Damages suffered, etc., etc.
IMPLIED AVERMENTS
(The Legal Effect of the Pleading)
Not to be Pleaded-
Conclusions of Law
A. Definition of right:
Entitled to have the money paid,
Had right of way,
Was entitled to distribution as heir at law,
Holds statutory lien on property,
Right to have property re-delivered,
Right to be secure against harm by defendant,
etc., etc.
B. Imposition and origin of duty:
Duty to pay,
Duty to give right of way,
Can be compelled to yield possession,
Required to refrain from injuring plaintiff,
Forced to pay liens on property,
Obliged to report to Secretary of State, etc., etc.
C. Affixation of liability:
Must respond in damages for wrong,
Must restore property,
Must not make wrongful claims,
Must pay his note, etc. etc.
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Under Subdivision 1 and 2 of Category I, an ultimate fact
is stated within the requisite degree when the direct averment
of the end product or result is made, and not by setting forth
the history or process by which the result is reached; this is
true notwithstanding the same form of statement appearing
in another particular area of the plea, would be regarded and
treated as a factual conclusion. If the history or process appear
in this category, it is treated as surplusage, and is insufficient
without giving the end result or product. It must do this to be
"certain to a common intent."
Under the 3d and 4th subdivisions (Category II) certainty
of allegation to a certain intent in general, is demanded. The
statute requires documents to be exhibited, when the action
rests on such documents; time and circumstance must be pleaded;
amount and character of the res, in proper cases, must be
shown, or a bill of particulars referred to; a fair illustration
of the diorism existing between this category and Category I,
is afforded in the typical mechanic's lien case, where the sub-
contractor sues the principal contractor and the owner: to pre-
sent the requisite status of plaintiff, it is necessary, under
Category I to allege that the principal contractor had contracted
with the owner for the erection of the structure.51 This need
be averred only with certainty to a common intent, e, g.,
"plaintiff says that defendant A agreed with defendant B, the
owner of the real estate hereinafter described, that defendant A
should erect therein a dwelling house."
It is unnecessary that the contract be specifically set forth. 52
However, if the sub-contractor seeks to recover from defendant
A on a special contract between himself and defendant A, as
is usually the case, then the contract falls within the second
category and must be pleaded with certainty to a certain intent
in general, and must be set forth.53
Carrying the illustration to Category II, a bill of particulars
may be exacted to require the itemization ("with certainty to a
certain intent in every particular") of the articles furnished
and the dates of furnishing the same; a definite averment of
value, if the price has not been fixed by contract; a specific
averment that the materials were furnished for the structure;
a particular alleiation that the notice of intention to claim lien
51 Ogg v. Tate, 52 Ind. 159.
52 Gilman v. Gard, 29 Ind. 291; Neeley v. Searight, 113 Ind. 316.
53 Stephenson v. Ballard, 50 Ind. 176.
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was filed within the statutory time and a copy of the notice,
etc.; that the materials were not paid for, etc.54 We shall carry
the illustrations further in analytical form:
SOME TESTS OF APPLICATION OF THE RULE
1. Action: Damage to plaintiff's sheep by defendant's dog. Com-
plaint:
Category I (2). Plaintiff owned five sheep.
Category II (4). Defendant owned a dog.
Category III (5). Defendant knowing dog would attack
sheep (scienter) permitted dog to be at large.
Category III (6). Dog attacked and bit plaintiff's sheep
damaging them Thirty Dollars.
2. Action: Divorce.
Category I (1) (b) Plaintiff is and has been for two
years last past a resident of Indiana:
Category I (2) Plaintiff and defendant intermarried.
Category II (4) Plaintiff and defendant have separated.
Category III (5) Defendant has during the married life
of the parties without cause, on divers occasion within
the past three months beat and bruised the plaintiff.
Category III (6) Defendant's said conduct has so
wrought upon plaintiff's emotions that plaintiff cannot
live with defendant any further in harmony, and
prays a divorce.
3. Action: Quiet title:
Category I (2) Plaintiff is owner in fee simple of land
described.
Category II (4) Defendant claims some right therein.
Category III (5) Simple negative of all right of defend-
ant therein.
Category III (6) Cloud on title; prayer to quiet title
against cloud.
4. Action: To set aside will:
Category I (1) (b) Plaintiff is child of deceased.
Category II (3) Deceased died leaving property, and
will is probated.
Category II (5) Defendants are maintaining will.
54 Davis v. McMillan, 13 Ind. App. 424, 40 N. E. 274.
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Category III (5) Purported will is not the will of de-
cedent, because (statutory requirements of pleading).
Category III (6) Prayer that will be set aside and held
for naught.
5. Action: Negligent injury to plaintiff's infant son:
Category I (1) Plaintiff is father of son.
Category I (2) Child an infant and under control of
plaintiff.
Category II (4) Plaintiff's child and defendant were
making contemporaneous use of (specifically describ-
ing) public highway, defendant immediately ahead of
automobile in which plaintiff was riding sixteen feet
separating them.
Category III (5) Defendant suddenly slowed down and
abruptly turned to left, all without giving any signal
of his intention to do so.
Category III (6) Automobile in which plaintiff child
was riding collided with defendant's automobile,
throwing child through windshield of car and frac-
turing skull, breaking cheek-bone of left cheek, tore
skin in back and displaced spinal column. Hospital,
Doctor, nurses, unable to work, permanently injured,
etc.
6. Action: Conversion of personalty:
Category I (2) Plaintiff was on the 5th of April, 1931,
owner of cow valued $50.
Category H (4) On said day defendant without leave
of plaintiff took said property into his possession.
Category III (5) Defendant thereupon converted the
same to his own use.
Category III (6) Damages to plaintiff $50.00.
ILLUSTRATION OF IMPROPRIETY IN PLEADING AND WHAT CONSTI-
TUTES PLEADING OF EVIDENCE IN FOREGOING:
First hypothetical case:
Category I (2). Plaintiff negotiated with Tom Smith, who
owned sheep, for and agreed to and did pay Tom Smith
$30.00 for five sheep and thereby became the owner of
said five sheep.
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Note: No statement that plaintiff was the owner of said
sheep, and pleads evidence as to how plaintiff may have
acquired them.
Category II (4). Defendant stated to plaintiff that he (de-
fendant) was the owner of a certain dog.
Note: No statement that defendant did own the dog. Plead-
ing evidence (admission) which would be sufficient at the
trial to prove ownership, but not the allegation of an
ultimate fact.
Category III (5) Defendant told plaintiff that he, defendant,
had seen the dog attack a sheep a week before injury to
plaintiff's sheep; and notwithstanding defendant per-
mitted dog to roam at large.
Note: Insufficient for same reason as above.
Category III (6) Dog chased sheep around pasture five
times, and when plaintiff went out to pasture shortly
afterwards, found five of the sheep bleeding from wounds.
Note: Insufficient for same reason as above.
Fifth hypothetical case:
Category I (1) Plaintiff married his wife Julia in January,
1923, and in December, 1923, said wife bore plaintiff a
son named Frank.
Note: The court will infer from what is said that Frank
was the son of plaintiff, but unnecessarily prolix pleading
of evidence. The ultimate fact is not asserted, but court
will infer it.
Category II (2) Defendant moves that the plaintiff be re-
quired to state facts to support the conclusion that the
child was under the control of plaintiff at the time of
accident.
Note: Motion properly overruled. Not gist of action.
Merely inducement. Must be sustained by proof but
amounts to assertion of ultimate fact.
Category III (5) Allegation: Defendant made turn to right
so negligently that collision ensued.
Note: Motion to state facts to support conclusion would be
sustained. Assertion of ultimate fact, but not stated
with certainty to a certain intent in any particular.
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ILLUSTRATION OF LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
Case 2. Divorce. Category I (1) "Plaintiff is qualified to bring
an action for divorce."
Category I (2) "Plaintiff and defendant, under the laws of
Indiana, are husband and wife."
Category III (5) "Defendant brutally exceeded his legal right
to correct and punish plaintiff."
Case 5. Negligence: Category III (5) "Defendant failed to
give the statutory signals of his intention to turn."
Case 6. Conversion: Category III (5) "Defendant thereupon
dealt with said property contrary to law."
In each of the above instances a motion to strike out should
be sustained, but on demurrer the pleading will be treated as
if the allegation were not in the complaint at all.
VIII
THE FORMULA IS CONSISTENT WITH PRECEDENTS
To test the formula to ascertain how consistent it is with
reasoned precedents of the Supreme and Appellate Courts of
Indiana, since the adoption of the code, and particularly since
the "conclusion" acts of 1913 and 1915, supra, we take the lib-
erty of examining the cases.
Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. R. Co. v. Beach55 was the theme
of three opinions in the Appellate Court.56 Appellee suffered
personal injury in a motor rail car on which he was passenger.
It was charged that the car was operated at an excessive rate
of speed, to-wit: in excess of thirty miles per hour, and by
reason of such excessive speed, the operator, not being able to
stop the car, negligently ran the car against and over a dog
causing the car to be derailed thereby injuring appellee. The
motion to make more specific, as the Court says, "Called for
matters of evidence." The allegation falls under Category III
(5) and is an allegation certain to a certain intent in every
particular, because it avers that fifteen miles an hour was a
speed, prohibited by the rule of the appellant, and specifically
charges that "the speed of the car, in the particular exigency,
caused the derailment by collision with the dog. Had the alle-
55 168 N. E. 204.
56 163 N. E. 618; 165 N. E. 82.
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gation merely been that the defendant, by its servant, negli-
gently operated the car against a dog, thereby causing the de-
railment, it would have been amenable to the motion.
In an earlier case569 the theory of the complaint was an
estoppel preventing defendant from retaking possession of an
automobile on a conditional sale note that had become due, the
estoppel being pleaded by the following allegation:
"That when the first payments became due May 30, 1926,
being short of funds, he asked for an extension of time for pay-
ment and the time was extended until June 16, 1926, and pay-
ment of $72 was made which was the May payment."
Shortly afterwards the car was retaken. The motion asked
that the plaintiff be required to state specifically who sanc-
tioned the extension of time. This was the gist of the action
and falls under Category III (5). The motion was denied, de-
nial of it was properly held reversible error.
Afterwards57 the Appellate Court considered an action by
a holder on a promissory note against the maker, in the body
of the note was the recital that it covered deferred installments
under a conditional sale contract between the parties. The mo-
tion was to require the conditional sale contract to be set forth.
Appellee was a holder in due course. The statement was merely
a recital of consideration, and, therefore, was entirely irrelevant
to the action.58 The motion was properly overruled, as the
reviewing court held.
We do not consider herein cases where the soundness of the
action of the reviewing court, in upholding the lower court in
overruling a motion, is so palpably obvious as to require no
further justification. Only where real difficulty of decision is
apparent from the pronouncement of the court do we regard
the case relevant to our thesis.
We are also omitting notice hereof statements of the court,
obiter, where a demurrer or motion, other than a motion to
make more specific or to state facts to support conclusions, has
been overruled, and the ruling assigned as error, and the court
has pointed out, in rather broad language, that the criticised
matter could have been reached by a motion to make more spe-
cific, considering those decisions in no manner controlling.
56a Norton v. Forshan, 87 Ind. App. 352.
57 Dorbecker v. Downey et al., 88 Ind. App. 557.
5s Burns R. S. 1926, Sec. 11362.
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Nor are we considering or analyzing cases where the Su-
preme Court or Appellate Court fail to set forth sufficient por-
tions of the pleading to which the motion was addressed to
determine therefrom what the motion sought and in what the
criticism consisted.
The Supreme Court, in 1926,59 reversed the Appellate Court6 o
and might be understod as holding that, in an action to quiet
title, it is insufficient for plaintiff to aver simply that "he is
the owner of the equitable title" to the land in controversy;
that the trial court should have sustained a motion to require
plaintiff to set out "facts relied on as constituting ownership
of an equitable title." At first blush this ruling appears to run
counter to our formula, (the allegation falling under Category
II (3), but on closer examination of the allegation we find it
to contain an irreconcilable contradiction in terms: "that plain-
tiff is the owner in fee simple of the equitable title." Thus it
appears that not only is "certainty to a certain intent in gen-
eral" as required under this category, lacking, but even the weak-
est degre of certainty, "certainty to a common intent," is ab-
sent. The allegation is most uncertain and to a dubious intent.
In 1885 a case involving an occupying claimant's complaint
for recovery for improvements was considered. 62 The claim was
for "clearing and fencing, removing stones knd putting the
land in a state of cultivation, of the value of $150.00" and a
motion was made to require the complaint to be made more
specific, which motion was overruled. Reversing the ruling,
the Supreme Court held the appellant was entitled to a state-
ment of the character and value of the clearing and of the kind
and amount of fencing as well as his specific statement of what
was done in the way of putting the land in a state of cultivation;
in other words, plaintiff's claim should be itemized. On apply-
ing this case to the touchstone, we find that the item of the
eomplaint held to be subject to the relief and remedy prayed,
falls under Category III (5) and (6), and the decision was
proper.
An elaborate opinion by the late Presiding Judge Dausman
in 1921,3 requires thoughtful consideration, especially in view
59 Neal v. Baker, 198 Ind. 393, loc. cit. 400.
60 147 N. E. 635.
62 Wallace v. Brooker, 105 Ind. 598.
63 Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Nchols, Adcmr., 78
Ind. App. 361.
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of the fact that a transfer to the Supreme Court was denied
the appellant. Breaking up the complaint there under review,
under the various categories heretofore postulated, we find
The Supreme Court fell into the same error in 1921, (Cincinnati, I. & W.
R. R. Co. v. Little, 131 N. E. 762, 190 Ind. 662) as did the Appellate Court
in Central Bank v. Martin, supra, and in Temple v). State ex rel., 185 Ind.
139, in holding that
"The mere charge in general terms that an injury was caused solely by
the negligent acts and omissions of the defendant without alleging that the
defendant did any negligent act, or omitted to do anything, having a tend-
ency to cause it, might have to be disregarded as the mere statement of a
conclusion of law."
This is inconsistent with the statute and Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. Mc-
Cartney, 121 Ind. 385; Ohio, etc., By. W. Co. v. Walker, 113 Ind. 196,; Ham-
mond, etc., Co. v. Schweitzer, 112 Ind. 246; Louisville, New Albany & Chi-
cago By. Co. v. Linch, 147 Ind. 165 (168); Citizens Street Ry. Co. v. Jolly,
161 Ind. 80, wherein the court says (page 85):
"the rule is well settled by decisions of this court that a general allegation
of negligence in a complaint or other pleading is sufficient to withstand a
demurrer for insufficiency of facts."
Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Walker, 113 Ind. 196, 3 Am. St. 638; Louisville, etc.,
R. Co. v. Bates, 146 Ind. 564, and cases there cited. In each of the para-
graphs in question it is alleged and shown that the injury of which the
plaintiff complains was caused "solely by the fault, carelessness, and negli-
gence of the defendant and its servant and employes, as aforesaid." This
can not be said to be a mere recital of a fact, but is a direct averment there-
of, and is sufficient to disclose that the injury sustained was the direct result
of the negligence imputed to appellant. Brinkman v. Bender, 92 Ind. 234,
and cases there cited; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kendall, 138 Ind. 313; Chi-
cago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 164 Ind. 143 (151); Lake Erie, etc., Co. v. Cot-
ton, 45 Ind. App. 580 (584), which decisions preceded the acts of 1913. And
the following decisions subsequent to the act of 1913: Louisville & So. Ind.
Traction Co. v. Cotner, 71 Ind. App. 377 (379), wherein it was held that the
bare allegation for personal injuries "that the defendant then and there by
its agent and servants carelessly and negligently ran said electric car upon
and against said plaintiff" is, in the absence of a statement of specific facts
showing otherwise, a sufficient averment of negligence to withstand a de-
murrer for want of facts. Citizens Street Ry. Co. v. Lowe, 12 Ind. App. 47;
Lake Erie, etc., R. R. Co. v. Moore, 42 Ind. App. 32.
It might with propriety have been said that if the statement in the com-
plaint (under categories II (3) and (4) failed to show a duty or a right on
the part of the plaintiff, then the bare allegations that plaintiff suffered
injury, through the negligence of the defendant, would be insufficient;
but this is far from saying that an allegation, by way of a conclusion, that
the defendant negligently committed a wrong, is insufficient as against a
demurrer, and has never apparently been so held on a direct decision by any
court of this state, except in the case of Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago &
St. Louis Ry. v. Nichols, Admr., supra.
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Category I (1) Plaintiff was administrator of the estate of de-
ceased.
Category I (2) Deceased was of full age and a physician who
met his death by alleged wrongful act.
Category II (4) Decedent was a wayfarer on the highway, de-
fendant's railroad crossed the highway at an acute angle
and at grade.
Category III (5) (a) Recites obstruction of view on the ap-
proach to the crossing,
(b) "That said defendant then and there carelessly and
negligently failed to operate any gate, warning travelers
of the approach of trains;
(c) "That said defendant did then and there carelessly and
negligently fail to operate a signal device warning trav-
elers of the appoach of said train ;"
(d) "That said defendant did then and there carelessly and
negligently operate a train going west on the south track
which was then and there the track used by east bound
trains ;"
(e) "That said defendant did then and there carelessly and
negligently run and operate its said train at a dangerous,
reckless and unusual rate of speed of from sixty to sev-
enty miles per hour;"
(f) "That defendant by said negligent means aforesaid did
then and there carelessly and negligently run, operate
and propel its said train on, across and over said highway
crossing where said Joseph Ross Wilson was then and
there traveling thereby killing him ;"
Category III (6) That he left a widow dependent upon him, he
was a physician, he had a large profitable practice and was
52 years of age. Damage $10,000.00.
The defendant moved the court to require plaintiff to state
facts to show what duty the defendant owed to decedent with
respect to each averment of negligence; and to show how the
duty arose. The motions were overruled. We proceed on the
assumption, as the Appellate Court did, that the motions were
sufficient to request a resolution of conclusions into facts. As
to several matters falling in category III (5), the court held that
whether a duty to maintain gates at that crossing rested upon
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the defendant, was a questiOn of law. Later in the opinion the
learned Judge in effect says that, there being no statute making
such a requisition, the question would be one of fact for the
jury under the evidence, provided there were some circum-
stances alleged which disclosed
"a peculiarly hazardous condition, and that the absence of gates
constituted a violation of duty to use due care which may ulti-
mately become a question for the jury under proper instruc-
tions."
With every respect for the learning and caliber of Presiding
Judge Dausman, we must confess that this is, in effect, a con-
tradictory statement-to say in one breath that whether there
is a duty to maintain gates at a crossing is a question of law,
and in the next that it may be a question of fact where the con-
ditions are shown to be hazardous. Then, further on in the opin-
ion, the court brushes the conclusion of negligence (absence of
gates) entirely aside and holds the allegation is wholly insuffi-
cient "to constitute a case of amenable negligence based on the
failure to maintain gates." The Court evidently holds dif-
ferently as to the question of a failure to maintain signals or
warning devices. After determining that there is no statute
requiring maintenance of such signal or warning devices, it is
said
"if the facts were properly pleaded, it might have been a ques-
tion for the jury, under proper instructions, to determine
whether the defendant ought to have maintained some warning
device at that particular crossing in order to discharge its duty
to exercise care and diligence commensurate with the obvious
danger."
Then it is said that this averment likewise fails to state a
ground of amenable negligence and must fall for the same reason
that the first assignment of negligence must be disregarded.
As to the charge of operating trains west on the south-bound
track, instead of the north-bound track, we concur with the
court's statement that the railroad company had the right to
run its train in either direction on either track, and no fact
is shown which could militate against that right. As to the
fourth charge of negligence (Category III (5)
"that said defendant then and there carelessly and negligently
ran and operated its train at a dangerous, reckless, and un-
usual rate of speed, from sixty to seventy miles per hour."
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we are also in agreement with the Court's holding it to be a
question of fact for the jury, only after the plaintiff has by his
pleading, shown conditions and surroundings,
"so that the court may determine whether the jury can legiti-
mately draw therefrom the conclusion that the particular cross-
ing was one of such peril to travelers on the highway as that
the rate of speed would constitute a violation of duty to exercise
due care for the public safety. * * * From that premise it
follows logically, as a matter of good pleading, that the facts
which make a particular crossing extraordinarily hazardous
must be averred in the complaint and the broad averment that
the defendant carelessly and negligently ran its train at a high
ahd dangerous, reckless and unusual rate of speed of from sixty
to seventy miles per hour was not sufficient."
But we are in utter disagreement with the learned judge in
holding that a motion to make more specific was not the proper
(and the only) mode of reaching the insufficiency.
As to the fifth ground of negligence, (Category III (5), that
the defendant operated the train without sounding a whistle or
ringing a bell, or in any other manner warning persons traveling
upon said highway of the approach of said train, it was prop-
erly held to be a correct averment of negligence under the
statute.
The Court held that counsel for the defendant were mis-
taken in their remedy by motion to make definite and specific.
"That motion is appropriate where the averment is sufficient
to withstand a demurrer, but is indefinite, because ambiguous.
* * * On the defendant's theory of the complaint, the ap-
propriate method of attack would have been by motion to strike
out. * * * Counsel contend, however, that each averment
states a conclusion, and that therefore, he pursued the remedy
prescribed by statute. This contention is rather indefinite, but
we gather from the briefs and argument that they mean to say
that whether or not an act was done negligently is a conclusion.
* * * The terms 'negligence,' and 'negligently' signify that
which is within the realm of fact * * * when the pleader
relies on a negative tort, he usually avers that it was done negli-
gently, carelessly or recklessly. In either case the averment
states an ultimate fact-nothing more or less."
It is then declared that the defendant should have moved
to separate the first paragraph of complaint into further para-
graphs so as to present but one theory in each paragraph, and
then should have tested each paragraph by a demurrer. Or, to
have required the plaintiff to elect a particular theory of negli-
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gence on which he desired to go to trial; then the court proceeds
to announce that neither of these remedies was available, because
each of the several allegations is interdependent with the others
and connected therewith.
This unfortunate tergiversation and deflexure make a very
sorry mess of the decision, largely nullifying its utility as a
precedent; and our research has not revealed any decision that
supports the ultimate conclusion on either ruling and we have
examined with care those cited by the learned Judge. The mu-
tually self-destructive pronouncements, preliminary and finally
made, are impossible of comprehension in totality. In the first
place it has never before or since been held that in averring the
gist of the action the statement of the doing of an act negligent-
ly, carelessly or recklessly is the statement of an ultimate fact.
All the holdings are that such epithetical qualifications stated
in relation to a gistal averment make of the latter a factual
conclusion-both at common law as well as under the code,-
unless the particular acts or omissions are conjointly stated, in
which case it properly characterizes the ultimate fact.64 The
cases cited by Judge Dausman to support the holding, appear to
hold directly to the contrary.65
It evidently did not occur to Judge Dausman that a de-
murrer may be directed to a specific part of a complaint con-
taining a distinct averment of breach of duty, and that it is not
necessary that the same be separated into paragraphs in order
to render a demurrer proper.66
We proceed to consider other cases of similar nature. In
another railroad crossing casefta it was held that a complaint
alleging
64 Harris v. So. R. Co., 129 Ga. 388; Jeter v. Schwind Quarry Co., 97 Md.
696; Wilbur v. Rhode Island Co., 27 R. I. 205; O'Dell v. Wolcott, 14 Ga.
A 536; McInerney v. Virginia, etc., Co., 118 Fed. 653; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
Medlock, 187 Ind. 224; Curtis v. Mauger, 186 Ind. 118; Tipton Light, etc.,
Co. v. Newcomer, 156 Ind. 348; L. & N. R. Co. v. Bates, 146 Ind. 564; Peer-
less Stone Co. v. Wray, 143 Ind. 574; L. & N. R. Co. v. Berkey, 136 Ind. 181;
Mississinewa Min. Co. v. Patton, 129 Ind. 472; Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Walker,
113 Ind. 196; Hammond v. Schweitzer, 112 Ind. 246; Rushveille v. Adams,
107 Ind. 475; Cleveland, etc., R. W. Co. v. Wiynant, 100 Ind. 160; Louisville,
etc., R. W. Co. v. Krinning, 87 Ind. 351.
65 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 106 Ind. 73.
66 Mustard et al. v. Hoppes et al., 69 Ind. 324 (326); Sheet V. Longlois,
69 Ind. 491 (495); Nowlin v. State, 30 Ind. App. 277 (279).
66 Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. v. Craycraft, 5 Ind. App. 332, 32 N. E. 297.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
"that the defendant on the 31st day of May, 1889, without any
fault or negligence on plaintiff's part, carelessly, negligently and
wrongfully ran its train over and upon the defendant's brown
horse mule,"
was sufficiently specific, in the absence of a motion, and by in-
ference this holding was approved by the Supreme Court. 7
An exception to the exigibility of the rule as to factual con-
clusion is to be noted. Where a statute is the foundation of the
action or prescribes the remedy, and gives grounds in the form
of factual conclusions, pleading the grounds in the language of
the statute seems sufficient, 68 e. g., pleading unsoundness of mind,
undue influence, and undue execution in a will contest in the
language of the statute, will not render the complaint amenable
to a motion to make it more specific.
A good example of an important point lost in a judicial
shuffle appears in a case finally decided by the Supreme Court
in 1920. 68a The cause was at first decided in the Appellate
Courteb where it was held, and we think rightly, that where the
allegations in the complaint falling under Category III (6),
charged generally that the plaintiff, who was suing his master
for injuries received by a car upon which he was working, had
sustained divers broken bones, injured muscles, ligaments, ten-
dons and other parts of plaintiff's leg and foot and to his
spine and back, "and other sickness, soreness, lameness and dis-
orders" the defendant should have been granted its motion to
require the plaintiff to specify in particular "what sickness and
soreness, lameness, and disorders the plaintiff suffered." The
motion was overruled and the Appellate Court held this to be
error. When the cases came to the Supreme Court on transfer,
this portion of the complaint was entirely ignored and the duty
of the Supreme Court, under the Constitution,68c was not ful-
filled, as the opinion by the Supreme Court is entirely silent
on this point. The complaint under Category III (6) also
charged that the car under which plaintiff was working was
moved "without reasonable or sufficient notice or warning to
the plaintiff." The court held that
67 Faubre Coal Co. v. Kushnet, 188 Ind. 314.
68 Phillips v. Gamwon et al., 188 Ind. 497.
68a Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Strzob, 190 Ind. 85.
68b 123 N. E. 182.
68 Sec. 5, Art. VII, Indiana Constitution.
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"In cases where the facts to be alleged are peculiarly within
the knowledge of or presumed to be known to the opposite party,
sound reason does not require the certainty and particularities
usually necessary in ordinary cases."
The pat inquiry is suggested by this dictum whether it isn't
true that in almost every personal injury case the defendant
has as much, generally more, knowledge as to how the accident
happened than the plaintiff, and particularly as to the move-
ments made by the defendant in an automobile accident case, and
would that excuse the plaintiff from making any allegation of
specific act of negligence? This charge falls under category
III (5) and the Supreme Court should have denied a transfer
from the Appellate Court which required that charge to be made
specific as part of the gist of the action. Had it been alleged
that no warning was given, then, of course, the motion would
have been properly overruled. This we believe is a very un-
fortunate precedent.
In 1916, in an action by a mechanic to foreclose his lien
against the owners, who were tenants by the entireties, 69 the
owners sought to have made more specific the following allega-
tion, "the principal contract was made with Herman Haehnel"
for the construction of the building and
"The buildings were constructed with the knowledge, consent
and acquiescence of the defendant Catherin Haehnel and' that
in all things herein mentioned said Herman Haehnel acted for
himself and also for his said wife as her agent."
This allegation clearly fell under Category II (4) and, there-
fore, not within Lord Coke's rule requiring it to be certain to
a certain intent in any particular, but certain only to a certain
intent in general. The general averment, therefore, that the
contractee's wife had knowledge and acquiesced in the construc-
tion of the buildings, and that her husband was her agent and
acted for herself and himself in making the contract, was prop-
erly held to satisfy the rule of pleading.
In a case decided by the Appellate Court in 1921,70 an action
against a street railway company for fraudulently procuring a
release from liability for personal injuries to a passenger, the
allegation in the complaint, material to the consideration of the
matter under treatment, is that
69 Haehnel v. Seigenoif, 63 Ind. App. 218.
70 Terre Haute, Idianapolis & Eastern Traction Co. v. Hollard, 76 Ind.
App. 99.
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"defendant, through its agents and servants entered into plan,
after the injury to plaintiff, to cheat and defraud plaintiff out
of the cause of action and damages."
There were other allegations concerning the acts of the de-
fendant, through its agents and servants, in making misrepre-
sentations thereby procuring the receipt and release. The de-
fendant filed a motion to require the plaintiff to give the names
of the "agents and servants" who were implicated. The court
overruled the motion, and the Appellate Court held that it was
error because plaintiff did not aver nescience as to the identity
of such agents and
"the position they held with reference to appellant, and appel-
lant was certainly entitled to be advised in the allegations of
the complaint who were the alleged agents and servants who
perpetrated the fraud upon appellee."
(Note the inconsistency of this holding with that observed
in the Haskell & Barker Car Co. case, sup!ra.) The court cites
as supporting this Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Nixon, 76 Ind. App.
86. We believe the cited authority is not a precedent, because
in the Nixon case the matter sought to be made more specific
had reference to Category III (5) and (6) which were stated
by way of conclusion, whereas in this case the matter fell under
Category III (4) and under that category, it will be observed,
the certainty of the pleading must be of a degree only to a cer-
tain intent in general, and not, as under Category III, certain
to a certain intent in every particular. That an allegation in a
complaint that the defendant corporation did or omitted to do
certain things, suffices, and that it is unnecessary to set forth
that the acts were done by the agents or servants of the corpora-
tion or to name such agents, was theretofore well settled in
Indiana, as in other states, thus:
"A corporation can act only through an officer or agent, and
when a corporation is charged with having done an act, such
allegation will be held to mean that the act was done by an
officer or agent. Appellant knew what officers and agents it
had, and the extent of the authority of each, and the rule has
long been established that a plaintiff is not bound to plead facts
which are peculiarily within the knowledge of the defendant."71
The Supreme Court in the last mentioned case cited by the
Appellate Court, supra,7 2 held it proper to overrule a motion to
71 Indiana Bicycle Company v. Willis, 18 Ind. App. 525.
72 Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Crunk, 119 Ind. 542 (545-546).
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make more specific which sought to have plaintiff set forth the
names of the agents and servants by whom defendant's train,
inflicting injuries, was operated. These two decisions73 were
cited with approval as precedents on analogous questions, and in
some instances on the identical question, in later decisions.74
So it appears that Judge Nichol's opinion7 5 stands conspicuously
alone in holding exigible on motion by defendant corporation,
against whom a tort is alleged, a statement of the specific names
of the agents of the defendant claimed to be involved in the
transaction on which the cause is grounded.
In another mechanic's lien case,76 the lower court, errone-
ously overruled a motion to make more specific a matter in the
complaint falling under Category II (4) of the above outline
because the allegation dealt with the relationship between plain-
tiff and defendant and was not pleaded with "certainty to a
certain intent in general," it not appearing definitely, as the
reviewing court determined in reversing the action of the lower
court in overruling the motion, therefrom
"whether the plaintiff relied on an implied or express contract,
and whether the work was done on the request of the defendant,
or as shown in the notice of lien that the work was performed
and material furnished pursuant to a contract between plain-
tiffs and other sub-contractors, and contracts with the owner
of the right-of-way"
notwithstanding a personal judgment was sought against the
defendant. In the same case, anent other matter falling under
Category II (4), the Court held it unnecessary to specifically
recite the terms of an oral contract forming the basis of a me-
chanic's lien.
It is, of course, never error to overrule a motion to make
more specific an averment not a necessary part of the statement
of the alleged cause of action.77
73 119 Ind. 542 and 18 App. 525.
74 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gray, 107 Ind. 395 (401); Singer Sewing
Machine Co. v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. 116 (120); Feighner v. Delaney, 21
Ind. App. 36 (37); P. & A. Dispatch, Inc. v. McDougall, 91 Ind. App. 181
(184).
75 Terre Haute, etc., Traction Co. v. Holland, supra.
76 Yawger & Company v. Joseph, 184 Ind. 228.
77 Premier Motor Mfg. Co. v. Kilford, 61 Ind. App. 164 (167); Cincin-
nati, I. & W. R. R. Co. ov. Little, 190 Ind. 662.
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x
PROCURING IMPROPER RULING ON MOTION PRECLUDES INTRODUC-
TION OF EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN CONCLUSION
An interesting development growing out of the act of 1913
is the holding-supported by logic and justice-that where a
motion has been overruled to state facts to support a conclusion,
it is deemed a decision, procured by and binding on the pleader
resisting the motion, that all the facts known to and relied on
by him to support the general averment are already stated in
the pleading, and he will not be permitted to introduce any evi-
dence resting upon the indefinite averments, where they fall
under Category 111.78
There appears to be no precedent for this holding, and Judge
Ewbank, in the initial opinion inaugurating the rule, cites none.
It may now be taken as thoroughly engrafted on Indiana rules
of pleading and practice, and no careful practitioner can justify
criticism of it.
XI
NECESSITY FOR A DEFINITE RULE OF DECISION
So frequently do we meet in opinions, in passing upon the
action of the lower court in overruling a motion to make more
definite and specific or to resolve a conclusion, the trite and
indefinite generality:
"It is essential that the issuable facts alleged in the complaint
be stated in a sufficiently certain or definite manner so as fully
to inform the defendant of what is alleged against him, and
thereby prepare him to meet the charge of his defense. Beyond
this, the pleader is not required to go."'79
How little aid can the bench, the bar and the student gain from
this to determine whether or not there is a sufficient pleading
of the facts "so as to fully inform defendant of what is alleged
against him", and how to frame a plea which will square with
the edict? It is begging the question. Uniformity of rule in
78 Terre Haute, I. & E. Traction Co. v. Phillips, 191 Ind. 374; Lake Erie
& W. R. R. Co. v. Malloy, 78 Ind. App. 72; Payne v. Shelton, 78 Ind. App.
123; Terre Haute, L & 9. Traction Co. v. Scott, 197 Ind. 587; Neal v. Baker,
198 Ind. 393; Tecumseh, etc., M. Co. v. Buck, 192 Ind. 112 (128); Enterprise
T. & T. Co. v. Craig, 195 Ind. 302.
79 Cleveland, C., C. & S. Ry. Co. v. Mann, 76 Ind. App. 518 (520).
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decision can never be thus achieved. Every repetition of the
pronouncement, except as a preface or after-thought, in the
official opinions of our courts of review, but tends to strengthen
the thought held in many quarters, that the code practice courts
here face a problem the difficulty of which verges on insolubility.
The need of some finite formula or working rule becomes vocif-
erous when we read, on a related question, thus from the reports
of our Supreme Court:
"It sometimes happens that facts are so close to the line dividing
inferential facts from evidentiary facts that the only safe plan
is to put them in the special verdict, where they can do no
harm if they should turn out, in the opinion of the court, to be
evidentiary facts, and where their absence might be fatal if
they should turn out to be inferential facts".80
It is not anticipated that the correct ruling on every motion
will gravitate to the court through the operation of the proposed
formula as fundamentally and irresistibly as the workings of
the law of molecular attraction; nor is it even pretended that
the proposal is sound in all of its features, nor that it is insus-
ceptible to improvement. As declared in the prefatory chapter,
the purpose is to essay a means to the desideratum, not to dictate
a procrustean bed. We endeavor to be of aid, we deplore the
idea of ips! dixit. Without such constant endeavors, we should
be ridden by the tyranny of fixed opinion, or hedged in by obscur-
antism, or warped out of touch with the living, scientific present.
80 Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Jones, 69 N. E. 191, 192, 32 Ind. 189
(quoting Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 37 N. E. 348, 141 Ind. 550).
